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BOOK REVIEW
I n the twenty-first-century global economy, “innova-tion” has become a powerful, if not defining, term to describe the key to successful firm, industry, and 
national competitiveness. To further support this state-
ment, the 2010 McKinsey Global Survey found that 84% 
of those executives surveyed agreed that innovation is 
“extremely” or “very important” to their respective com-
pany’s growth. Adam Segal, the Ira A. Lipman Senior Fel-
low for Counterterrorism and National Security Studies 
at the Council on Foreign Relations, in his latest book ar-
gues that the 1990s world of the United States as the polar 
center of military and economic power has evolved to the 
new twenty-first-century, tripolar, international political 
economy where the United States, China, and India are 
vying for global economic leadership. While the previous 
century saw a conflict-based battle for world hegemony 
between the United States and the USSR, in Advantage, 
Segal proposes a different thesis for the twenty-first-cen-
tury global political economy—one based in a multipolar 
world of networked innovation. 
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States will need to confront immediate technological and 
economic challenges from individual Asian countries, 
American leadership will not only need to recognize the 
gap between hardware and software, but understand how 
the interaction of economics and national security, high 
and low politics, shapes technology.
In the fourth chapter, Segal explains that if one sim-
ply focuses on the economic and technological aspects, 
the view of what is occurring in the global economy is 
distorted. For example, companies such as Cisco, GE, 
Siemens, and other high-technology multinationals were 
not invited to invest in China and India because of their 
national commitment to free trade, but because they 
were expected to improve the technological capability of 
domestic companies, which will in turn increase national 
power and influence. Segal recommends expanding our 
focus to include how the equally compelling concerns of 
autonomy, security, and equality direct and influence the 
national path of innovative technology creation.
In Chapter 5, Segal argues that an overzealous US 
policy to slow the diffusion of American technology, 
especially through export controls on dual-use (civilian 
and military) technologies, could have adverse conse-
quences on an American system of open innovation. As 
Segal notes, “American defense planners are less con-
cerned with the transfer of manufactured goods, such as 
computer chips or flat screen technology, than with the 
transfer of knowledge about how they are manufactured” 
(p. 115). While it would be irresponsible of the American 
government not to protect the loss of sensitive technolo-
gies, policies limiting access to research scientists and en-
gineers and their ideas would do greater harm to US for-
eign policy and national security—as well as the ability to 
innovate domestically—than a leak of technology secrets.
The risks and benefits of an “open world,” the theme 
of Chapter 6, builds on the previous chapter’s discussion. 
Segal views the basic equation for the United States as 
simple: “economic strength and national security depend 
on innovation, innovation thrives only with openness, thus 
policies must defend and nurture openness” (p. 137). This 
“equation,” however, must be translated into clear policy 
decisions, with support for foreign direct investment into 
the United States (and rejecting economic protectionism) 
and expanded immigration (i.e., H-1B visas for science and 
engineering students, researchers and high-technology 
entrepreneurs—with the latter including the examples of 
Andy Grove of Intel, Sergey Brin of Google, and Pierre 
Omidyar of eBay). As Segal argues, “since the most ef-
fective means to boost U.S. security is to promote the 
innovativeness of the economy, the primary goal must be 
attracting capital, ideas, and talent” (p. 161).
In Chapter 1, Segal defines innovation as “the cre-
ation, commercialization, and spread of novel ideas” (p. 
11). The term innovation is also employed “expansively,” 
with “a primary focus on science-based product innova-
tion” rather than process innovation, although he astutely 
notes that “they often blur, with changes in process feed-
ing discovery of new products and vice versa” (p. 11). 
Segal proposes the following innovation-based scenarios 
for America’s future:
Two outcomes for the United States are possible in the 
wake of the economic meltdown: an innovation system, 
already neglected, slowly crumbling and shunted aside 
by rising technology centers in Asia; or one renewed 
and revitalized, tightly linked to new ideas and talent 
around the globe. The challenge [for Americans]? 
To recover a culture of innovation that was driven un-
derground, overshadowed by [the lure of] sexy credit 
default swaps and easy spending. (pp. 17–18)
In Chapter 2, Segal presents his analytic framework 
for assessing the forces that confront the United States 
and shape competition from Asia. This framework in-
volves three critically important pairings or “couplets” 
(and all necessary to get an accurate representation of the 
“barriers and fissures in the landscape of technological 
development” (p. 21): hardware and software; high and 
low politics; and the local and global sides of innovation. 
Says Segal:
For hardware, clear metrics such as the number of 
scientists and patents are easy to measure and report, 
while the software—the abstract web of institutions, 
relationships, and understandings that move ideas 
from lab to market—is more complex. For high and 
low politics, the argument that openness is critical to 
U.S. national security is difficult to make and counter-
intuitive. The cost of being wrong—explaining to the 
enraged public why some important piece of technol-
ogy ended up in the wrong hands—is concrete. And if 
there is any consensus about globalization, it is that the 
local will suffer. Distance is dead. Everything that can 
move, will. (p. 22)
In Chapter 3, Segal puts to rest the idea that China 
and India are technological superpowers. The reality is 
that science and technology capacity is only incrementally 
shifting to Asia and it will likely take several decades to 
appreciably close the gap between East and West. In Asia, 
the physical infrastructure is changing rapidly, but the 
politics and psychology of the innovation process—i.e., 
producing new ideas, training new talent, and launching 
new companies (the “software”)—lag. While the United 
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Governments and markets 
are partners, with govern-
ment spending providing a 
“cushion” during a reces-
sion and supporting basic 
research, while excessive 
government intervention and 
high taxes undermine incen-
tives to invest in start-ups. 
innovative themselves—networks tap new scientists into 
a steady flow of ideas and possible partnerships and in 
turn allow their own ideas to enrich the larger group. 
(p. 219)
In his concluding chapter (10), Segal offers what he 
refers to as the “six design principles” of future U.S. in-
novation:
• The software of innovation must strive for openness and 
collaboration of open source. This involves the avail-
ability of high-skilled immigrant talent, foreign direct 
investment, and the flow of ideas into the United States.
• The software of innovation should be both secure 
and relatively stable. However, any attempt to restrict 
the flow of information, people, or technology must 
consider the cost-benefit trade-off to the US innova-
tion system.
• Risk remains essential to innovation, as risk takers 
generate new knowledge and companies. The limited 
role of government should be to help create the con-
ditions—e.g., through tax relief, supporting access to 
loan programs, and assistance to community banks—
for entrepreneurs to access capital and venture capi-
talists to accept risk.
• Innovation is decentralized to a distributed commu-
nity of users and developers. Regional economies are 
In Chapter 7, Segal argues that US government and 
business leaders need to focus on understanding how 
interest groups and ruling coalitions develop a national 
technology trajectory within a specific time frame. He 
identifies four critical policy tools to be employed: use 
dialogue and cooperation to convince other countries of 
shared interest and reward those choosing a common 
interest with the United States; employ the wedge to create 
space between interest groups within a country, such as 
over intellectual property rights in China; and have the 
United States wield a stick in its negotiations for a positive 
outcome or as sanctions when dialogue and cooperation 
fails. Also, the United States needs to maintain a realistic 
sense of its future role in Asia, as the day will come when 
it is no longer the biggest technology and science power. 
Finally, to ensure the viability of the U.S. innovation 
system, public policies must balance security and open-
ness domestically and access to foreign markets by U.S. 
companies.
In recommending policy for promoting domestic in-
novation in the United States, in Chapter 8 Segal posits 
that governments and markets are partners, with govern-
ment spending providing a “cushion” during a recession 
and supporting basic research, while excessive govern-
ment intervention and high taxes undermine incentives 
to invest in start-ups. Government, says Segal, should 
focus on encouraging new forms of technology start-ups 
and then giving them the space to grow, with much of 
this support taking place at the city-regional level where 
the comparative advantages of collaborative networks 
supporting innovation thrive (e.g., the bioscience innova-
tion cluster in the Phoenix–Tucson–Flagstaff, Arizona, 
area). Segal identifies the role of the US government as 
supplying “the use of research support, tax incentives for 
venture capital investments, collaborative R&D schemes, 
and the joint development of intellectual property” (p. 
195) with the private sector.
Chapter 9 addresses what Segal views as a popular 
misconception: that the United States is facing a shortage 
of high-skilled workers. This view of a domestic shortage 
of the number of scientists and engineers is a “soft” esti-
mate that has been consistently wrong since World War 
II. According to Segal:
Building collaborative communities of scientists and 
entrepreneurs is as important, if not more so, than up-
ping the raw numbers. These communities increase the 
chances that students expressing an interest in science 
or math will pursue a career in those fields, and draw 
more women and minorities into the sciences. They 
also make it more likely that the new scientists will be 
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of facilitation for innovation risk takers; it is not only to 
create a favorable tax environment encouraging technol-
ogy entrepreneurs and venture capitalist investment, but 
also to create a favorable regulatory environment that in 
the past too often has hindered the activities of innovative 
entrepreneurs. Expanding trade adjustment assistance to 
companies and funding greater investment in on-the-job 
training and worker training are policies of limited long-
term impact. Adverse trade policies are better addressed 
at the macro level through bilateral trade negotiations; 
companies that are growing develop ongoing job train-
ing programs for new employees, and present employees 
have access to an abundance of part-time college and uni-
versity degree and certification programs—often with tu-
ition assistance support from employers. At the national 
level, adequate funding for basic, and to a lesser extent, 
applied research (where there is no or less opportunity, 
respectively, for private appropriation regimes) is an im-
portant function of the federal government in a national 
innovation system.
Segal has identified a critical element that uniquely 
underpins the modern US innovation system: regional 
hubs of technological innovation. The states, as “laborato-
ries of democracy,” are now emerging as “laboratories of 
innovation.” Moreover, keeping technology-based manu-
facturers located in the United States, near these innova-
tion clusters, ensures that process innovations continue 
to be developed in America. Regional innovation clusters 
in Arizona, North Carolina, and California, to name a 
few, are fueling opportunities to create examples of the 
“software of innovation.” From these regionalized tech-
nology innovation hubs located throughout the United 
States, America can indeed be tied into a global “smart 
grid” of established and emerging centers of scientific 
excellence. Segal is a strong advocate of regional “innova-
tion clusters” of academia, business, and industry; he has 
correctly identified the face (and core) of a successful 
future US innovation system capable of developing and 
commercializing emerging technologies for the global 
marketplace.
critical to establishing new technological start-ups, 
fostering partnerships among government, businesses, 
and universities.
• The United States must revamp its innovation system. 
To this end, Americans must have a stake in this “soft-
ware” by expanding trade adjustment assistance and 
wage insurance, fund greater investment in on-the-job 
training and worker training, and fix the system of 
health insurance and make it portable.
• The United States must make sure that it does not 
become complacent about its global science and 
technology relationships, and that these evolve into 
a smart grid for the global system of innovation that 
tie America into established and emerging centers of 
scientific excellence.
Advantage is a well-researched and -written book, and 
Segal effectively explains the innovation challenge from 
Asia that now confronts the American economy. He has 
interviewed numerous leading government policymakers 
and technology business leaders throughout Asia, and 
makes effective use of their insights to establish the context 
of emerging global innovation competition. Surprisingly, 
there is a paucity of similar insights from their American 
contemporaries. Segal has carefully woven together a rich, 
example-laden tapestry that knowledgeably and effectively 
presents the foreign challenges that the American inno-
vation system now confronts. Where this reviewer is not 
entirely convinced by Segal is with certain of his proposed 
policy prescriptions (i.e., design principles).
Segal’s recommendations on the “software of in-
novation” have elements of the “tried-and-true,” recent 
evolutions in innovation policy, as well as some old policy 
canards with questionable economic impact. Keeping 
America open to new ideas, international collaborations, 
and foreign direct investment is crucial to the success of 
its future innovation system. It should go without saying, 
however, that this “openness” to collaboration with cer-
tain foreign nationals firmly stops as it relates to national 
security-related technologies. Government’s role is one 
Thomas A. Hemphill is an Associate Professor of Strategy, Innovation, and Public Policy at the School of Management, 
University of Michigan–Flint. Hemphill has presented his research at leading academic conferences, including the Acad-
emy of Management and the Academy of International Business. His articles have appeared in Business Economics, 
Business Horizons, Business and Society Review, Competition & Change: The Journal of Global Business and Political 
Economy, the Journal of Business Ethics, the Journal of Innovation Management, Science and Public Policy, Technol-
ogy Analysis & Strategic Management, and Thunderbird International Business Review, among others.
